

**Evolution of the
Office of the
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
for
OPERATIONS AND PLANS**

1903-1991

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS
WASHINGTON, DC



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DAMO-ZA

18 NOV 1991

This pamphlet is for personnel within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations and Plans and is intended to provide a brief overview of our organizational history and that of our predecessors. The focus is upon the major functions and subdivisions of the organization and how they have changed over time.

The ODCSOPS is the G-3 for the Army—the nerve center. In addition to our Joint responsibilities, we are responsible for charting the course to achieve the Chief of Staff's vision for the Army. Providing direction for today's Army requires more than pointing the way. We must strike a balance between sustaining the values rooted in the past and adapting to new realities with resolve and vision. It is not enough for us to state where we are going—how shall we deal with the turbulent future that lies ahead. Such declarations without context beg for explanation: How do we come to that decision? Why should we move in that direction? If we are to act wisely on behalf of the nation and the Army, it is critical that we understand what we are, where we have been, and how those that came before us confronted the challenges they faced.


As was the case with the Army's past victories, our recent victories in Grenada, the Cold War, Panama and the deserts of Southwest Asia are directly related to the efforts of those who came before us. It is, therefore, prudent that we understand the history of this organization and that of our predecessors to maintain this standard and continue this tradition of service to our nation and the Army.

J. H. BINFORD PEAY III
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans

20/11/91

Introduction

During the last ninety years, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) and its predecessors on the Army Staff have experienced numerous changes in organization and function. Successive periods of growth and decline, rather than progressive expansion, have marked that history. This pamphlet outlines the major changes from the establishment of the War Department General Staff in 1903 to the organization of ODCSOPS in the summer of 1991.



The General Staff Selection Board convened in March 1903 to select forty-two officers for service on the General Staff.

Members of the American Expeditionary Forces in France in World War I. From an etching by J. Andre Smith.



The Early Years, 1903–1916

When Congress created the Office of the Chief of Staff in 1903, it provided that a General Staff corps assist the Chief. On 15 August 1903 the first Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, organized the General Staff into three divisions and divided the Staff's responsibilities among them. In addition to several other functions, the First Division received mobilization, operational, and joint planning and organization and training of the mobile Army's combat arms—the infantry, cavalry, and field artillery. The Second Division collected military intelligence and directed the activities of U.S. military attachés. The Third Division's duties included planning for combined maneuvers, dealing with all questions concerning the location and construction of coastal fortifications, and overseeing the organization and training of the coast artillery and combat support and combat service support troops (at that time called "special arms and technical services").

Over the next few years Chiefs of Staff expanded the responsibilities of the Third Division. In the process it acquired two different names—the Second Section and the War College Division. When Lt. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee became Chief of Staff early in 1904, he gave the Third Division responsibility for preparing studies of possible theaters of war and devising operational and joint plans. The students and instructors of the Army War College, the latter drawn from the Third Division, did the actual planning. Four years later another Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, combined the Second and Third Divisions into a new organization which he called the Second Section. The Chief of the Third Division became the Chief of the Second Section. Bell also charged the Second Section with mobilization planning. The 1908 reorganization for the first time assigned all planning functions to a single General Staff agency. The First Division, renamed the First Section, retained responsibility for the organization and training functions of the mobile Army. In 1910 Bell's successor, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, renamed the Second Section the War College Division but

did not change its functions. The First Section became the Mobile Army Division.

The internal business procedures of these early Staff agencies were as different from modern Staff procedures as the organization of the War Department General Staff was from the organization of the modern Army Staff. Because the divisions and sections usually worked in committees, the general assumption in the War Department was that the resulting recommendations represented the consensus of informed opinion in the service. General Bell first began experimenting with the use of action officers in the Office of the Chief of Staff in 1910. General Wood extended the concept to the rest of the Staff and abolished the committee deliberations.

Some historians consider the date of General Wood's reorganization, 26 September 1910, as the birth of ODCSOPS as a formal General Staff agency; others would suggest 24 June 1908, when the Second Section was created, or even 15 August 1903, when the General Staff was established. The disagreement centers on the genealogy of the planning function, because the General Staff did not explicitly recognize the operational function until World War I. Before then the First Division and its successors served as the implicit custodians of the as yet undefined operations function.

These early years also saw the origins of Army participation in what later generations of officers would refer to as "the joint arena." Secretary of War Elihu Root and Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody created the Joint Army and Navy Board in 1903 to consider matters of common concern to the two services. A number of difficulties with the original arrangements became clear over the next few years. All the board members had other full-time responsibilities but lacked a staff dedicated specifically to their support. Because the board lacked the authority to establish its own agenda, the services had to initiate all questions for discussion. There were no ex officio members; the service secretaries appointed officers to the board individually. However, the custom developed of appointing the President of the Army War College to the board. In 1905 Lt. Col. William W. Wotherspoon, a future Chief of Staff, became the first officer to serve simultaneously as Chief of the Third Division and as Acting President of the Army War College. He was the first representative of the Third Division on the Joint Board. When Wotherspoon—who was promoted to brigadier general in 1907—stepped down in 1909, the practice lapsed until General Wood revived the dual appointment in 1912. From then until World War I the Chief of the War College Division served on the board.

World War I and the Interwar Years, 1917-1939

The National Defense Act of 1916 severely cut the size of the General Staff, and the War College Division received most of the remaining General Staff officers and responsibilities. U.S. entry into World War I, however, brought swift removal of the restrictions on the Staff's size, thus enabling the War College Division to reorganize. Five standing committees were created within the division: Organization and Recruitment, Military Operations, Equipment, Training, and Legislation and Regulations. The Military Operations Committee was responsible for operational planning, including the defense of the United States and its overseas possessions. It drew up plans for sending troops to Europe, prepared studies on the amount of shipping available, and issued troop movement schedules.

From May 1917 until August 1918 the structure of the General Staff went through almost continuous reorganization. The original Staff organization proved unable to cope with the emergency created by American mobilization, particularly in the supply field. By August 1918 four main divisions of the General Staff had emerged: Military Intelligence, War Plans, Operations, and Purchase, Storage, and Traffic. The functions of the old War College Division were divided between the War Plans Division and the Operations Division. The Director of the War Plans Division was responsible for war planning, legislation and rules, training and instruction, and historical records management. To his counterpart in Operations fell the functions of recruitment, personnel, overseas priorities, troop movements, determination of types and distribution of equipment, and full responsibility for the development, acquisition, supply, and maintenance of motor vehicles.

When General of the Armies John J. Pershing became Chief of Staff in 1921 he adopted a modified form of his American Expeditionary Forces headquarters staff, which remains the basic functional organization of the General Staff. Pershing divided the Staff



Secretary of War Elihu Root instituted the reforms that created a War Department General Staff.

into G-1 (Personnel), G-2 (Military Intelligence), G-3 (Operations and Training), G-4 (Supply), and the War Plans Division. G-3 was divided further into three branches: Organization, Training, and Operations. The War Plans Division (WPD) was divided into sections representing the interests of G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4. WPD was to formulate plans for deployment of military forces in the theater of war and to provide the nucleus of a general staff required by General Headquarters in a theater of military operations. The division of responsibilities indicated that the officers who developed Pershing's War Department General Staff assumed that any future war would be similar to World War I. They provided for the Chief of Staff himself to command the Army's field forces in combat, leaving the Deputy Chief of Staff behind to administer the General Staff.

The various sections of the General Staff soon developed into small, self-contained bureaus acting independently and without proper coordination. Conflicting interests and ideas made Staff procedures slow, and decision making sometimes seemed interminable.

In May 1919 the Acting Director of the War Plans Division, Col. William F. Clark, proposed reviving the Joint Army and Navy Board, which had not met since early in World War I. He suggested that the board contain three Army members: the Chief of Staff, the Director of the Operations Division, and the Director of

the War Plans Division. To strengthen the power of the board, Clark wanted it to have the authority to initiate items for discussion. He also pointed out the need to establish a joint standing committee to support the deliberations of the board and proposed that the Army representatives come from the War Plans Division. The Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War accepted these recommendations, and War Department General Order 94 of 25 July 1919 put them into effect. In 1923 General Pershing substituted the new post of Deputy Chief of Staff, an office equivalent to the modern Vice Chief of Staff, for the Director of the Operations Division. This structure remained unchanged until World War II. Clark's "joint standing committee" was designated the Joint Plans Committee. Maj. Gen. William G. Haan, who became Director of the War Plans Division in June 1919, did not sit on the Joint Plans Committee. He appointed five officers from the War Plans Division as the Army's representatives, but among Haan's successors the tradition developed that the head of the War Plans Division should lead the Army contingent.

Infantry crossing the town square in Itri in the World War II Italian campaign.



World War II and Postwar Reorganization, 1939–1950

After General George C. Marshall became Chief of Staff in 1939, the Pershing Staff structure and procedures became increasingly unwieldy and the Pershing planning assumptions on the nature of the next war became less and less relevant. For two years the War Department struggled to adapt this archaic system to the changing circumstances of a global war. After Pearl Harbor Marshall set up his own organization, bypassing the old General Staff agencies and cutting their staffs by 80 to 90 percent. He created two new commands, the Army Ground Forces (AGF) and the Services of Supply, later renamed the Army Service Forces (ASF). AGF received the organization, training, and mobilization functions. A separate command, the Army Air Forces (AAF), administered its own personnel and training and organized and supported the combat air forces employed in theaters of operations.

General Marshall's command post was the War Plans Division, which was redesignated the Operations Division (OPD) and expanded from 52 officers in December 1941 to 197 by September 1945. OPD's principal reason for existence was to assist General Marshall in developing strategy and directing the conduct of military operations. It represented the Army in dealings with the Navy, the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, the White House, and the civilian war agencies. With the assistance of AGF, AAF, and ASF, OPD calculated the requirements in men and resources the Army needed to carry out the strategy and plans hammered out by the joint and combined staffs. It acted as a liaison between the overseas theaters of operations and the War Department, AGF, AAF, ASF, the Navy, and the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. OPD acted as the Army's top management staff. It was responsible for planning the Army's global military operations, for determining and allocating the resources required, and for directing and coordinating their execution.

OPD's organization reflected its several functions. The Strategy and Policy Group was responsible for strategy and planning and also served as liaison with other war agencies. In February 1942 the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, made the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, Col. Thomas T. Handy, the representative of the War Plans Division "in all joint and combined planning work." At the same time General Eisenhower removed himself from all planning committees and thereby established a precedent followed by all subsequent Chiefs of OPD.

OPD's Logistics Group determined the resources required to support projected military operations. It also represented OPD on joint and combined committees responsible for logistical planning. Necessarily, it worked closely with G-4 and ASF, and in the process considerable friction developed between OPD and ASF's Plans and Operations Division. ASF believed OPD did not pay sufficient attention to practical logistical problems, especially the lead time required to produce weapons and other materiel; ASF therefore sought a greater role in strategic logistical planning. OPD, on the other hand, resented ASF's attempted intrusions into its areas of responsibility.

OPD's Theater Group was the link between the Army at home and the overseas theaters, transmitting orders to and relaying requests from them. It exercised greater control over theater operations in the initial stages of the war, before theater headquarters had developed their own experienced staffs. An Executive Group provided personnel and administrative services, including the operation of OPD's Message Center and Records Section.

With the expansion of the war, the activities of these groups became so diversified that in February 1944 OPD established a separate Current Group, responsible solely for providing information on all current OPD operations. The Current Group prepared the War Department Daily Operations and White House Summaries, invaluable to executives because of their brevity. The division also created a Pan-American Group in April 1945 to deal with the problems of western hemispheric defense.

The key to OPD's success was its streamlined staff procedure, which emphasized delegating to the lowest possible level authority to make recommendations or to take action. Conferences between designated action officers, often junior staff members, and the responsible officials of other agencies replaced written concurrences submitted through formal staff channels. The belabored decisions reached by traditional staff procedures would have come too late to have any effect, and a wrong decision based on hasty research

was considered better than a tardy one based on more thorough study. Special requests for action from General Marshall required a reply within twenty-four hours. The requests were known as Green Hornets from their readily identifiable covers and the painful consequences for those who delayed acting upon them.

Of all the General Staff divisions, G-3 was least affected by the Marshall reorganization; its organization remained rather stable throughout the war. Comprising G-3 were an Organization and Mobilization Group and a Training Branch, both divided along ground, air, and service forces lines. A Policy Branch was added at the end of the war. G-3's major loss was responsibility for the Army's replacement system, which was transferred to G-1.

When General Eisenhower became Chief of Staff after the war, Army traditionalists in 1946 dismantled General Marshall's highly centralized organization and returned to the prewar Pershing pattern. G-3 became the Directorate of Organization and Training (O&T), with responsibility for War Department and Army-wide organizational planning added as an afterthought. The directorate gained the responsibility for oversight of training in overseas theaters, a task given to the theater commanders during World War II. The Operations Division became the Directorate of Plans and Operations (P&O), inheriting OPD's role as the Army's representative with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its committees. In July 1946 the Chief of Staff transferred responsibility for civil disturbance planning and operations from the Directorate of Organization and Training to the Directorate of Plans and Operations. Following the creation of the National Security Council in 1947, an Army representative from P&O, usually a colonel, attended the meetings of the council. These changes were matters of detail. The basic functions of O&T and P&O remained unchanged until April 1950.

P&O became a more complex organization in 1948. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, the Director of Plans and Operations from October 1947 until November 1948, obtained the position of Deputy Director. The new post provided an officer well versed in all the directorate's business to run the agency during the temporary absence of the Director. Maj. Gen. Ray T. Maddocks, who had served in the Strategy and Policy Group in OPD with Wedemeyer early in World War II, became the first Deputy Director. He succeeded Wedemeyer as the Director on 15 November 1948. That same year P&O received a second deputy director, the Deputy Director (Atomic Energy), who had general staff supervision over all atomic energy matters before the Army Staff. Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols, who had served as the District Engineer of the Manhattan Engineering District during World War II, became the first

Deputy Director (Atomic Energy). The most important organizational change in P&O, however, came in 1947. General Eisenhower, acting on the suggestion of Dr. Arthur H. Compton, created the Advanced Study Group, an innovation which an Air Force colonel later labeled "one of the brightest flashes in peacetime military history." The charter of the Advanced Study Group called for it to do no less than to determine the impact of the atomic bomb on warfare. When Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte became the Director of Plans and Operations in 1949 he found that, due to the uncertainties of the subject, the group had strayed into areas that fell more in the domain of the Air Force and the Navy than of the Army. He recommended that the Joint Staff assume the planning function. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, and the Army transferred the Advanced Study Group in late 1949. P&O retained the responsibility to monitor the activities of the Joint Advanced Study Group and to develop concepts on the use of atomic weapons on the land battlefield.

Air Force support for the Advanced Study Group was a bit of amity in a period of increasing contention. In the late 1940s the Truman administration cut service budgets but not service missions. The resulting interservice rivalry was intense. Guided missiles provided one area of conflict. The Army was becoming heavily committed to developing missiles for antiaircraft, field, and heavy artillery missions. When General Maddocks became the Director, he found that P&O lacked officers with any expertise in the field and treated the guided missile as just another weapon. He secured approval to create a three-man team of guided missile experts in the directorate. The solution, however, proved inadequate for what suddenly became a very pressing problem. In September 1949 the Air Force requested operational responsibility, that is, command and control, of all guided missiles. General Bolte, Maddocks' successor, convinced the Chief of Staff to give the Director of Plans and Operations "the responsibility for General Staff support and coordination of guided missile policies." The Chief of Staff then added another general officer, Brig. Gen. Stanley R. Michelsen, to P&O. Bolte established a Guided Missile Group and made Michelsen the Chief. He served as the Army representative on the Guided Missile Committee of the interdepartmental Research and Development Board. General Michelsen had the rank and the expertise to defend successfully the Army's position.

A number of officers within P&O expressed reservations about the diminished responsibilities of the directorate after 1946. The issue for these critics of the Eisenhower reorganization centered on whether P&O could function as adequately as OPD did in

wartime. Early in 1947 the Director of Plans and Operations, Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, attempted to amend War Department Circular 5-5 to make P&O "... the command post of the Chief of Staff for all operations." The Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, objected that the proposal curbed his prerogatives and succeeded in blocking the change. In 1949 the Chief of Military History, Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, reopened the issue of P&O's ability to coordinate other Staff agencies during wartime when he sent the manuscript of Dr. Ray S. Cline's history of OPD during World War II to P&O for comment. General Bolte, then the Director, concluded that the study proved the need for P&O to assume a role similar to OPD in any future conflict. He arranged for Cline to brief the officers in P&O. In 1950 Bolte succeeded in having the successor to P&O made the executive agency for the Army for control of operations during the Korean War.

Unloading troops and equipment
at Inchon during the Korean War.



Organization for Hot and Cold Wars, 1950–1963

Special Regulation (SR) 10-5-1 redesignated the Plans and Operations Division of the General Staff as the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, General Staff, on 11 April 1950. The new title came as part of a general reorganization of the Army Staff, but internally G-3 remained much the same. Three divisions replaced the three groups into which the Plans and Operations Division had been divided. For two of the divisions, Operations and Plans, the change was only semantic. They retained the same branches and functions that they had possessed as groups. The third group, the Guided Missile Group, was abolished. Its Chief became the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Guided Missiles). The two Deputy Directors became Deputy Assistant Chiefs of Staff with no change of functions.

The Organization and Training Directorate, formerly coequal with the Plans and Operations Directorate, became part of G-3. Its functions consisted only of policy and review. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and the Chief of Army Field Forces received the manpower and training functions. The Korean War, which broke out less than three months later, brought only minor changes in G-3 internal organization. In the summer of 1950 the Operations Division added a Deployment Branch, and in September 1950 G-3 added a Psychological Warfare Division. In early 1951 the division left G-3 and became the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, one of the agencies in the Army Special Staff.

In part because of the Korean War, G-3 became heavily involved in research and development early in the 1950s. This trend also represented a natural evolution based on G-3's new charter—the 1950 reorganization had provided that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, would be responsible for planning related to “the establishment of Army requirements and objectives.” The Army's experience in World War II had emphasized the production of

good quality materiel in vast quantities rather than the development of highest quality equipment in limited amounts. During the Korean War, the need to mobilize from a very cold production base meant that production once more had to take precedence over research. After the war the Army finished a distant third in the interservice budget war, because the "New Look" strategy of the Eisenhower administration stressed the Air Force's strategic mission. As one action officer in G-3 observed, it looked as if the Army would spend the next big war guarding SAC bases unless something was done. Technological innovation, therefore, offered a way to capture the public imagination and, possibly, a large portion of the defense budget while at the same time carrying on needed modernization in a force still dominated by World War II doctrine, organization, and equipment.

During World War II, General Brehon B. Somervell, the Commander of ASF, had failed in his attempt to abolish the War Department bureaus and to replace them with a purely functional organization. At the end of the war, General Eisenhower abolished ASF. The bureaus remained, and with them a complex, probably insoluble, problem of coordination. One method of short-circuiting the complexities was to appoint one man to multiple positions. In 1948 the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Atomic Energy), also became the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and the senior member of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. In January 1951 the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Guided Missiles), took on a corresponding dual status. He became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (Special Weapons). In 1952 G-3 abolished the two Deputy Assistant Chiefs for Atomic Energy and Research and Development and replaced them with a Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Research, Requirements, and Special Weapons, a position that lasted until 1956.

Aviation constituted the third area of research and development interest to the Army during this period, along with guided missiles and nuclear weapons. Although individual aviators had served in G-3 since 1945, it was only in October 1952, partially in response to the extensive use of helicopters in Korea, that G-3 established the Army Aviation Section in the Organization, Research, and Development Branch of the Organization and Training Division. In 1954 it became a branch in the Organization and Training Division and in the following year a separate division headed by a general officer, Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze. By that time the type of research with which G-3 was concerned had changed.

Secretary of the Army Robert Ten Broeck Stevens commissioned a study of Army organization which recommended that the Army

"clarify, enhance, and strengthen the position of Chief of Research and Development" in the Office of the Chief of Staff. On 15 November 1954 all research and development functions in G-3 were discontinued. The new emphasis in the agency became combat developments rather than hardware. On the same date G-3 established a Doctrines and Developments Branch in the Organization and Training Division. SR 10-5-1, Change 6, issued on 17 January 1955, underlined the situation by deleting all G-3 responsibility for the establishment of requirements and objectives.

Two additional changes occurred in G-3 prior to the next major reorganization of the Army Staff. On 25 July 1954 the Army discontinued the Office of the Army Representative to Inter-American Boards and transferred the functions to G-3. Two days later G-3 created the position of Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for International Affairs to serve "as the principal deputy to the ACofS, G-3, in all matters involving foreign affairs," which included military assistance programs already handled by G-3. Later that year G-3 established a Joint Action Control Office which reviewed, coordinated, and monitored action on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters within the Department of the Army.

General Williston B. Palmer, the new Vice Chief of Staff, was a key figure in the reorganization of the Army Staff announced on 27 December 1955 as Change 13 in SR 10-5-1. Once again the reform, which took effect in January 1956, focused on research and development. For G-3 the changes, as in 1950, were primarily in name only. The office was combined with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans to become the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (ODCSOPS). The four divisions became directorates with functions intact. The Deputy Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-3, became Assistant Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Military Operations (ADCSOPS). The Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for Research, Requirements, and Special Weapons (RR&SW) lost the RR&SW appellation.

Paradoxically, only in the area of research and development did the special regulation expand the functions of ODCSOPS. When General Palmer sent the original proposal for the reorganization to G-3 for comment, he gave the agency only five days to analyze and respond to the plan. Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, the G-3, nevertheless located an important flaw—ambiguity in the relationship between the Chief of Research and Development and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS). Harkins defined the relationship as he thought it should exist in a memorandum to Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, the DCSOPS designate:

I see the Chief of Research and Development as an operator, a director of the Research and Development Program, an initiator of new ideas, and a formulator of policies and procedures regarding the mechanics of research and development. I see the Deputy Chief of Staff for . . . [Military Operations] as the deputy having primary responsibility for establishing qualitative requirements for research and development based on estimated technological advances and strategic and tactical considerations.

Change 13 conformed to General Harkins' concept. The DCSOPS would furnish "guidance to the Chief of Research and Development, and other appropriate agencies, pertaining to the characteristics and requirements of future weapons, weapon systems, and related equipment based on tactical and strategic considerations." The DCSOPS thus regained part of the requirements function which G-3 had lost in 1954. The Chief of Research and Development retained the mission of defining military characteristics for Army materiel and equipment and of determining the level of quality required before the Army would consider purchase.

The remainder of Change 13 simply elaborated functions previously assigned to G-3, such as DCSOPS' responsibility for joint matters and joint decisions, or functions which G-3 had been performing but which the 1950 special regulation had not explicitly stated, as in aviation, guided missiles, and special weapons. Finally, the special regulation gave DCSOPS "general staff supervision and control" over the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government, the Chief of Psychological Warfare, and the Chief of Military History. As one critic has noted, it was a nebulous kind of authority because the Chiefs of these agencies could approach the Chief of Staff directly if they so desired. The principal function of "general staff supervision" was to give the impression to Congress that fewer agencies reported directly to the Chief of Staff. Army Regulation (AR) 10-5, 22 May 1957, reinforced the authority of the DCSOPS, giving him "direct supervision and control" of the agencies. A modification of 14 January 1958 added the Superintendent of West Point to the list.

Although the years from 1956 to 1961 were relatively uneventful from the standpoint of the overall Army Staff organization, the period is among the most complex and confusing in the history of ODCSOPS. The organization's mission statement underwent almost continuous revision. While the traditional agencies within ODCSOPS remained fairly stable—the Directorates of Plans, Operations, and Organization and Training—many others expanded, contracted, divided, and disappeared in a puzzling variety of ways.

General Eddleman, the first DCSOPS, had already served as G-3 some years earlier. Under his direction the organization un-

derwent a slow but steady growth in 1956 followed by a period of organizational stability, then a final reorganization just before he left office in 1958. In the spring of 1956 the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations acquired a responsibility for programs and budget. That summer Eddleman formed a Program and Planning Group which reported directly to DCSOPS through the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations for Programs and Budget. The Operations Directorate added the Air Defense Division, while the Plans Directorate created a Requirements Planning Division, which contained a Guided Missile Branch. In the fall the directorate abolished the division, while General Eddleman expanded the Guided Missile Branch into a directorate. Its responsibilities were wider than those implied in the title. The Director was "to provide more impetus to new weapons systems in the fields of guided missiles, free rockets, and nuclear-chemical-biological-radiological warfare" and serve as the primary point of interest on the Army Staff in those fields.

The disappearance of the Requirements Planning Division foreshadowed by almost a year the formal revocation of DCSOPS' authority to engage in requirements planning for research and development. AR 10-5, published in May 1957, also greatly reduced the functions given ODCSOPS in Change 13 of SR 10-5-1 of December 1955. Psychological and unconventional warfare, National Security Council and Operations Coordinating Board matters, equipment authorizations, combat developments, Army antiaircraft, and mobilization and demobilization planning disappeared. What effect, if any, these deletions had on the day-to-day operations of ODCSOPS is moot. No organizational changes ensued for almost a year.

In January 1958 the office received explicit recognition of its "overall staff responsibility for mobilization planning and implementation of mobilization as authorized." In March it once again received authorization to prepare requirements plans, but only for the Army's operational and training facilities used throughout the world. AR 10-5, Change 3, 10 July 1958, restored the function of "reviewing, coordinating, and recommending" the Army position to the ODCSOPS on matters before the National Security Council and before the Operations Coordinating Board. The same change gave the DCSOPS "overall staff supervision and coordination" of issues and policy related to psychological warfare and unconventional operations. Finally, in May 1960 ODCSOPS received recognition as the lead office on the Army Staff for combat development. It never formally obtained the requirements planning function, but by 1961 there was considerable criticism that once again the ODCSOPS staff was spending much time on hardware issues.

Early in 1958 General Eddleman directed his three Assistant Deputies to realign their responsibilities on a test basis. Following the successful conclusion of the test, he abolished the position of Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations for International Affairs and gave the post's responsibilities to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations for Programs and Budget which he renamed ADCSOPS for Operations and Programs. ADCSOPS became ADCSOPS for Plans and Requirements. In April Eddleman broke up the Guided Missile Directorate. The Surface to Air Missile Division joined the Air Defense Division to form the Air Defense Directorate. The remainder of the Guided Missile Directorate went into a new Special Weapons and Requirements Directorate. He abolished the Programs and Budget Group and established the Programs and Budget Directorate headed by the former Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations for International Affairs. Finally, he set up a Special Warfare Directorate encompassing both psychological and unconventional warfare, that is, propaganda and guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations by Special Forces. At the same time he convinced the Vice Chief of Staff to abolish the Office, Chief of Special Warfare. Eddleman hoped thereby to emphasize the planning function, to transfer certain intelligence-gathering and personnel responsibilities to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and The Adjutant General, and to make clear the U.S. Army Continental Army Command's (CONARC's) primary responsibility for training Special Forces units.

Lt. Gen. James E. Moore succeeded General Eddleman as DCS-OPS on 1 June 1958. The following month a combination of civil war in Lebanon and a bloody anti-American coup in Iraq brought American intervention in Lebanon at the request of President Camille Chamoun. In response Moore established an Army War Room in the Operations Directorate on 28 July 1958 under the direct supervision of the Army War Room Division (renamed the Command and Control Division in 1962). The War Room would remain open on a twenty-four hour basis, would provide a focal point for Army Staff efforts during emergencies, would maintain general situation maps and other information about current trouble areas, would keep current combat readiness data, and would give situation briefings for key officials.

In September General Moore concluded that General Eddleman's reach had exceeded his span of control. Moore decided to reduce the number of officers reporting directly to him and to his assistant deputies. He began by realigning the functions of his assistants. ADCSOPS for Plans and Requirements became once again simply ADCSOPS, while ADCSOPS for Operations and Programs

became ADCSOPS for International Affairs. In October he combined the Air Defense Directorate and the Special Weapons and Requirements Directorate to form the Air Defense and Special Weapons Directorate. Six months later the Army set up the U.S. Army Nuclear Weapon Coordination Group as a Class II activity of DCSOPS to monitor operational safety of Army nuclear weapons from conception to delivery. General Moore designated the Director of Air Defense and Special Weapons to supervise the new agency. At the same time that Moore created this new directorate by fusion, he reduced the Special Warfare Directorate to a division, which he placed in the Plans Directorate. He also established the post of Deputy Director for Plans for Special Warfare which carried the grade of brigadier general, but pressure from the Vice Chief of Staff to reduce the "excessive" number of general officers on the Army Staff led to lowering the grade to colonel in June 1959.

Although the Eddleman reforms of 1958 proved abortive, they reflected certain trends within the Army Staff which were not going to disappear. Generals Matthew B. Ridgway and Maxwell D. Taylor—the first through opposition, the second by advocacy—had established the Army's position regarding the Eisenhower administration's reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation by the Air Force to deter all forms of aggression from the Soviet Union and its allies. Their solution was "flexible response" as a national strategy, which meant that the Army needed to prepare to fight in all kinds of conflicts: a general war with full-scale nuclear exchanges, a limited war using tactical nuclear weapons or restricted to conventional arms alone, and guerrilla and antiguerrilla campaigns. General Eddleman had attempted to restructure DCSOPS to reflect these new ideas.

In July 1960 the Chief of Staff created a Long-Range Analysis Group to develop and coordinate long-range plans within the Army Staff, to provide guidance for the Army as a whole, and to prepare studies about the long-term future. The group reported directly to DCSOPS. The following month the Vice Chief of Staff, General George H. Decker, approved the creation of a U.S. Army Strategy and Tactics Group, a Class II field activity under DCSOPS, which would support planning by the Army Staff through developing and conducting war games. That summer the Army War College, which previously reported to CONARC, also became a DCSOPS Class II field operating agency; General Harkins had urged this as early as 1955.

In November, following the appointment of General Decker as Chief of Staff and the selection of General Eddleman as Vice Chief of Staff, ODCSOPS underwent further reorganization. Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes, the DCSOPS, created the Combat Developments Direc-

torate and simultaneously abolished the Air Defense and Special Weapons Directorate (AD&SW). He distributed AD&SW's functions among the other directorates. Oakes' successor, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, found the Combat Developments Directorate still too concerned with hardware issues; in April 1961 he abolished its commodity divisions and substituted a functional organization.

The advent of the Kennedy administration brought a series of new concerns into the highest levels of government. Both the President and the Attorney General were greatly interested in unconventional warfare and the development of the U.S. Army Special Forces. In response to a request from President Kennedy, Hamlett abolished the Special Warfare Division in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (the name given the Plans Directorate during 1960) and created the Special Warfare Directorate in January 1962. He also redesignated the Special Plans Branch of the War Plans Division, responsible for all Army planning involving the use of nuclear weapons, the Special Plans Division of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate. In March he transferred the functions of the Long-Range Analysis Group to the new directorate and abolished the group.

The same month that produced the Special Warfare Directorate in ODCSOPS also witnessed a decision by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara that had major implications for the entire Army Staff. He approved the recommendations of the Hoelscher Committee, which led to the abolition of the technical service chiefs' positions and to the organization of functional commands. Pending the establishment of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, General Hamlett created within the Combat Developments Directorate a Remote Area Conflict Office to expedite and coordinate combat developments relating to special warfare, counterinsurgency operations conducted by indigenous forces advised, supplied, or supported by the United States, and counterinsurgency operations conducted by U.S. forces.

In June 1962 Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker, Hamlett's successor, transferred the functions of the Remote Area Conflict Office to the newly activated Combat Developments Command. In August Parker created in his office a third assistant deputy, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations for Special Operations, with responsibility for special warfare, civil affairs, inter-American relations, and civil defense. ADCSOPS became ADCSOPS for Plans and Operations. ADCSOPS for International Affairs became ADCSOPS for Army Requirements and Programs.

Another consequence of the Hoelscher Committee recommendations was the abolition of the Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare; ODCSOPS received the office's planning and policy coor-

dinating functions in July 1962. Parker established a Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Directorate to handle the new responsibilities. The Hoelscher Committee had recommended that ODCSOPS establish a focus for all Army Staff planning in the nuclear field. Parker established the Office of the Special Assistant for Nuclear Activities in October 1962 as directed by the Chief of Staff.

The Kennedy administration also exhibited considerable concern about civil defense. On 1 May 1962 the Army abolished the Office of Civil Affairs as a separate Staff agency. That same day General Parker established a Civil Affairs and Civil Defense Directorate in ODCSOPS, incorporating the functions of the office and the civil defense responsibilities formerly assigned to the General Operations Division of the Operations Directorate. In late December 1962 he withdrew all civil defense responsibilities from the Plans and Organization Division in the Civil Affairs and Civil Defense Directorate and set up a separate Civil Affairs Division. During the first half of 1963 he transferred the division to the Operations Directorate.

A major reorganization of ODCSOPS in 1963 overshadowed the changes in the status of civil defense. The initial impulse for the reorganization, like so many other innovations during the early 1960s, came from the Hoelscher Committee. In 1961 it had recommended that the Army divide ODCSOPS into two independent agencies, one for joint planning and military operations, the other for training and programs. Generals Eddleman and Hamlett had objected to the proposal and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) had dropped it. At that point five directorates, one group, and two assistant deputies had reported directly to the DCSOPS, or almost the number of officials that General Moore had found excessive in 1958. By the fall of 1962 the number had increased to eight directorates, one special assistant, and three assistant deputies.

In late 1962, Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance resurrected the Hoelscher Committee proposal, and Secretary McNamara approved the plan. Implementation began in February 1963 with the establishment of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (OACSFOR) and ended with the transfer of functions to the new agency in April. ODCSOPS now contained two assistant deputies—ADCSOPS for Plans and Operations and ADCSOPS for Special Operations—and four directorates—Operations, Strategic Plans and Policy, Civil Affairs, and Special Warfare. The Programs and Budget Directorate went to OACSFOR. In its place General Parker created the Program and Budget Coordination Office, which reported directly to the DCSOPS; a colonel headed the new office. All the other directorates, the remaining Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Special Assistant also transferred to OACSFOR.

Helicopters brought a new dimension to Vietnam War combat.



The Vietnam Era, 1963–1973

Following the McNamara reorganization OSD increased pressure on the Army Staff for more accurate and detailed quantitative information in justification of requests for military forces and other resources. Simultaneously, growing U.S. advisory efforts in Vietnam expanded requirements for money, men, and materiel and emphasized readiness issues within the Staff. As a result the Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, established a Readiness Division in the Operations Directorate, ODCSOPS, in January 1965. The new entity took over the readiness functions of the Troop Operations Division, the Army War Room functions of the Command and Control Division, and the civil disturbance functions of the Civil Defense Division. At the same time, the Civil Defense Division was abolished, its civil defense and civil disaster functions going to the Troop Operations Division.

The introduction of Army combat troops into Vietnam the following spring, foreshadowing a heavier involvement, was the harbinger of further organizational changes in ODCSOPS. Chief of Staff Regulation (CSR) 10–34 of July 1965 integrated counterinsurgency responsibilities throughout all directorates. Previously only the Special Warfare Directorate (now renamed Special Operations Directorate) had dealt with counterinsurgency. In addition, the DCSOPS, Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., designated the ADCSOPS for Plans and Operations (ADCSOPS–PO) and the ADCSOPS for Special Operations (ADCSOPS–SO) as coequal assistants to the DCSOPS, each with a range of authority and responsibility equal to the DCSOPS. Each assistant would have directive authority over all directorates within ODCSOPS, including special operations. These moves reflected the desire of General Johnson, a former DCSOPS, to reduce the degree of independence that Army Special Forces had achieved through its sponsorship by the Kennedy administration.

As part of the July 1965 changes General Palmer reoriented the functions of the ADCSOPS–PO and the ADCSOPS–SO. The ADCSOPS–PO was to concern himself primarily with joint matters, while still cog-

nizant of unilateral issues having joint implications. Conversely, the ADCSOPS-SO was to direct his concern toward unilateral Department of the Army (DA) questions, while still informed of counterinsurgency, special operations, civil affairs activities, and those joint problems impinging on unilateral DA plans and programs.

Due to difficulties in the integration of Army information management systems, CSR 18-1, 28 March 1966, assigned greater responsibilities to the Command and Control Division in the Operations Directorate. Beginning in June 1966, the division had to coordinate the Army portion of the Consolidated Command, Control and Communications Program, had to serve as the ODCSOPS Data Automation Coordination Office and point of contact for Army Information and Data Systems, and had to act as ODCSOPS point of contact for strategic communications matters of an operational nature.

In December 1966, the sophisticated weapons technology for which Vietnam was a testing ground brought an additional duty for the DCSOPS, Lt. Gen. Harry J. Lemley, Jr. He became Chairman of the newly established Army Electronic Warfare Board. To assist Lemley in his new responsibilities, General Johnson set up the Office of the Executive Secretariat of the Army Electronic Warfare Board in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate.

ODCSOPS was now entering a period of organizational turbulence caused primarily by the expansion of the Vietnam War. Functions were realigned in a search for an organization that would respond more efficiently and cohesively to mission requirements. In April 1967 the positions of ADCSOPS-PO and ADCSOPS-SO were abolished and replaced by a single ADCSOPS. At the same time the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate was redesignated the Plans Directorate. A new International and Civil Affairs Directorate absorbed the functions of the abolished Civil Affairs and Special Operations Directorates, as well as certain international planning and policy functions. These latter functions were absorbed from the Foreign Military Training Division of the Operations Directorate and from the International Policy Division of the former Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate. The International Policy Division was abolished, its remaining functions going to the newly designated Plans Directorate. Finally, the Program and Budget Coordination Office was abolished and its functions divided between the Operations Directorate and the ODCSOPS Executive Office.

With ODCSOPS' attention focused on Southeast Asia during this period, very few organizational changes were made relevant solely to the Army in Europe. The most important was the establishment of the Army Command Center Support Office, a Class II

activity under DCSOPS. Organized in July 1967 in Washington, with a duty station at Stuttgart, Germany, this office served as the local point of contact to aid Headquarters, U.S. European Command, in the development and acquisition of computers for its command and control system.

Along with the tremendous demands imposed by the Vietnam War, ODCSOPS had to deal with the coordination and management of civil disturbance activities. The burden of these two responsibilities gave increased importance to the Army Operations Center (AOC) as the primary command and control facility of Headquarters, DA. For this reason and to push the development of the center as a facility for use by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, General Johnson separated the AOC from the Readiness Division of the Operations Directorate in September 1967 and gave the AOC status of a division. The AOC received the civil disturbance function. In March 1968, the AOC's mission expanded after it received the teleconference facility from the Staff Communications Division, Office of the Chief of Staff.

To this point, civil disturbance responsibilities were but one of the AOC's tasks. Similarly, these responsibilities previously had vied with others for attention in the Readiness Division. Whenever a major civil disturbance requiring federal troops took place, the Readiness Division or AOC was augmented by detail of personnel, thus creating an essentially ad hoc administrative arrangement each time; however, widespread and serious riots following the assassination on 4 April 1968 of an eminent civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., forced a change. On 23 April General Johnson transferred the AOC's civil disturbance functions to the Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations Directorate, a newly established Class II activity under the Office of the Chief of Staff.

Despite this divestiture, ODCSOPS continued to grow in response to the Vietnam War. Another reorganization in the fall of 1968 sought to streamline the International and Civil Affairs Directorate, reducing its divisions from six to four. In addition, CSR 10-34, 9 September 1968, established the staff actions control element of the Executive Office, ODCSOPS, as a separate office to deal with the torrent of actions that is inevitable in war. This new Staff Actions Control Office served as the principal contact point for all ODCSOPS unilateral actions.

Continuing problems in information management were reflected in a shift made in April 1969. The new Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, transferred the Army Operations Center Support Division from the U.S. Army Information and Data Systems Command (a Class II activity under the Comptroller of the Army)

and established it as the U.S. Army Command and Control Support Detachment, a Class II activity under the jurisdiction of the DCS-OPS. The detachment's mission was to support the command and control functions of ODCSOPS with automatic data processing.

With the advent of the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war came directed reductions in Army Staff personnel; these reductions, ordered in September 1969, resulted in a series of organizational changes in ODCSOPS throughout fiscal year 1970. The Operations Directorate experienced three major changes. The functions of the Army Operations Center and the Command and Control Division were combined to form a new DA Command and Control Division. Another entity was created by combining the functions of the Readiness Division and the Troop Operations Division to form the Troop Operations and Readiness Division, which also took over the regional strategy application function of the Western Hemisphere Division. The latter division and the Europe, Middle East, and Africa Division were abolished and replaced by a new Atlantic Division. One additional alteration was nominal and yet significant in that it mirrored the direction that U.S. policy was taking: the Far East and Pacific Division was renamed the Pacific Division. In the Plans Directorate, the Vietnam-swollen War Plans Division lost a number of functions to the Strategic Studies and Mobility Division, which was redesignated the Strategy, Studies and Mobility Division. Finally, in the International and Civil Affairs Directorate, a large number of the Politico-Military Division's functions went to the Foreign Military Training Division, which was renamed the Military Assistance Division.


Organizationally, at least, ODCSOPS caught its breath during 1971 and early 1972. But in May 1972, discontinuance of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands dictated the abolition of the Ryukyuan Affairs Division of the International and Civil Affairs Directorate. Some personnel of the defunct division were transferred to the Politico-Military Division to handle residual matters pertaining to the Ryukyus, while others went to the Military Assistance Division to assume the additional work load stemming from Vietnamization.

In October 1972, Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams took the preliminary steps for a major reorganization of the Army within the Continental United States (CONUS). Budgetary restrictions increased as the United States withdrew from Vietnam. A greatly reduced Army required greater efforts to ensure combat readiness and effective individual training and schooling. At the heart of the reorganization, which was carried out in 1973, was the elimination of the Continental Army Command and the cre-

ation of a Forces Command (FORSCOM) and a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Both of the new commands were single field headquarters. FORSCOM supervised the unit training and combat readiness of all Army units, including the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, and TRADOC directed all Army individual training and education as well as the development of organizations, materiel requirements, and doctrine. Another facet of the reorganization was a reduction of the involvement of Headquarters, DA, in the day-to-day operations of the major commands and the concomitant elimination of more than 800 spaces from the Army Staff.

As part of the CONUS reorganization, ODCSOPS gained the Unit Training Division from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. Transferring with personnel and functions intact, this element became a new division in the Operations Directorate. That directorate also received the Security Operations Division from the International and Civil Affairs Directorate. Because this shift included the civil affairs functions, the International and Civil Affairs Directorate was renamed the International Affairs Directorate and the Operations Directorate became the Operations and Civil Affairs Directorate. Most of the personnel reductions in ODCSOPS came from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Western Hemisphere Divisions, all of which were abolished. Their functions remained within the Operations Directorate in a new Current Operations Division. At the end of this reduction, ODCSOPS' combined military and civilian authorized strength stood at 366 on 30 June 1973, a loss of 44 spaces from the pre-reorganization days. The post-Vietnam era had arrived.

Maintaining equilibrium between staff organization and force structure and modernization is a never-ending task.



Growth in a Period of Retrenchment, 1974–1981

A major realignment of the Army Staff followed the CONUS reorganization of 1973. Effective in May 1974, the Abrams reorganization was the first major change of Army Staff agencies since 1962. The Chief of Staff, General Abrams, wanted to reduce the number of Staff agencies reporting directly to him and to reduce the size of the Army Staff by some 800 spaces, including military personnel who would be transferred to combat units. This would improve the Army's "teeth to tail" ratio, which Congress and OSD had demanded, and would permit creation of three additional divisions.

However, ODCSOPS (now retitled Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans) actually increased its authorized strength under the Abrams reorganization from 366 to 623 military and civilian spaces. The additional spaces came largely from three Army Staff agencies which were abolished: OACSFOR, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics (OACSC-E), and the Office of Reserve Components (ORC). ACSFOR functions and spaces transferred to DCSOPS included requirements approval and force structure and unit authorization. Telecommunications and command and control functions were transferred from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics. From Chief, Office of Reserve Components, came Guard and Reserve force training, readiness, plans, force structure, and budget. In summary, DCSOPS' new responsibilities were to review and approve materiel and organizational requirements, to determine materiel development and acquisition priorities, and to discharge telecommunications and command and control functions.

ODCSOPS spent the next several years trying to assimilate its increased responsibilities. The Aviation Directorate in OACSFOR had disappeared in the 1974 reorganization. General Abrams had believed that the Army Staff had developed enough experience in handling aviation matters since 1956 that aviation no longer

needed a focal point on the Staff. Aircraft could be treated like other major items of Army equipment such as M60 tanks or 105-mm. howitzers. He had distributed the functions of the Aviation Directorate among the directorates in ODCSOPS. The reform proved unworkable and drew considerable congressional criticism. As part of a major realignment in July 1975 the DCSOPS, Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles, established an Aviation Office with the Deputy Director of Operations, Brig. Gen. Charles E. Canedy, also acting as the Army Aviation Officer. A year later the office shifted to the Requirements Directorate, and Canedy became the Deputy Director of Requirements. The move resulted from the perception of the Director of Requirements, Maj. Gen. Vernon Lewis, that in the post-Vietnam era most aviation problems would fall in the area of requirements rather than operations. He convinced the new DCSOPS, Lt. Gen. Edward C. Meyer, that this view was sound.

A similar problem existed regarding nuclear and chemical matters when OACSFOR was abolished and this responsibility was transferred to ODCSOPS. At first, the Army nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) program was seen as an operational matter and responsibility for it was assigned to the Current Operations Division of the Operations Directorate. Later, the strategic and planning aspects of NBC matters were considered significant and the responsibility was transferred to the Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy. Concurrently, increasing Army interest in NBC matters following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War resulted, first, in the creation of a new division within the directorate and, finally, in the creation of two separate divisions—one for chemical and NBC defense matters and one for nuclear plans and policy.

At the same time, other important changes were made. Cowles downgraded the Military Support Directorate and made it a division under the Director of Operations. The Chief of Staff abolished its field agency, the U.S. Army Military Support Agency. Cowles abolished the Special Operations Division within the Operations Directorate and redistributed its functions throughout the directorate. Finally, he created a Mobilization Division in the Operations Directorate to place greater emphasis and reliance on the Reserve Components as a primary source for increasing the size of the Active Army whenever circumstances warranted mobilization.

During 1976 the Force Requirements Division was transferred from the Requirements Directorate to the Strategy and Security Assistance Directorate and redesignated the War Plans Division. The Strategy and Security Assistance Directorate was renamed the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate. Its Strategic Studies Divi-

sion was designated the Army Initiatives Group (AIG), which later became a separate element in ODCSOPS.

Transfer of the communications-electronics function to ODCSOPS in 1974 appeared to have created more problems than it solved. In March 1978 the Director of Management in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Thomas U. Greer, completed a study recommending the integration of the management of command and control, communications, and computers in Headquarters, DA. Partially accepting this recommendation, the Vice Chief of Staff, General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., in October placed automation and communications under a new Army Staff agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation and Communications (ACSAC). Command and control functions remained with ODCSOPS. Largely as a result of the transfer, ODCSOPS' authorized strength during fiscal year 1979 fell from 626 to 585.

In 1977 the Chief of Staff, General Bernard W. Rogers, established a study group headed by General Greer to investigate ways of improving the management of limited Army resources. Also in March 1978 General Kerwin approved the results: the consolidation of all manpower management responsibilities under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and of all military training responsibilities under the DCSOPS.

Another significant change that occurred at the same time resulted from the 1978 Special Investigation of Army Nuclear Matters study which recommended centralization of all NBC matters under a single point in the Army Staff. As a result, the Chemical and NBC Defense and the Nuclear Divisions were transferred from the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate and assigned to a new Nuclear and Chemical Directorate that was to remain stable during the succeeding reorganizations.

Dissatisfied with the lack of progress in post-Vietnam "modernization," Rogers in February 1979 established the Army Force Modernization Coordination Office (AFMCO) within the Office of the Chief of Staff, an outgrowth of the earlier Tank Forces Management Office. The mission of the new office was to coordinate the Army's force modernization program, which was fragmented among several Army Staff agencies, including ODCSOPS. The hoped-for yield was effective fielding of new and improved weapons and materiel systems. A small sixteen-man office, AFMCO was headed by Maj. Gen. Richard Lawrence, who previously had acted as chief troubleshooter on development of the Abrams tank. In effect AFMCO became a mini-ACSFOR.

Concurrent with these organizational changes, a small Army Long-Range Planning Group was established in late 1980 under the ODCSOPS Technical Advisor to prepare conceptual studies

dealing with the Army's long-range strategic requirements. Having quickly proved its value, this group was transferred to the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate a year later.

A final key change occurred in early 1981 when the ADCSOPS for Joint Affairs was concurrently designated as the Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy. Reflecting increased DOD emphasis on joint operations, this unification of function firmly tied long-range Army planning to the joint arena.

The Pentagon, command post for Army planning and operational control.



Reordering the Structure, 1981–1986

Lt. Gen. William R. Richardson became the DCSOPS in August 1981, just as the Army began to feel the impact of increased defense spending and began to make significant conceptual changes to develop its role in what became the AirLand Battle doctrine. Rarely had the peacetime Army ever faced such a magnitude of changes in its war-fighting concepts, and seldom had extensive funding been so quickly provided to carry out new programs. Consequently, Richardson's arrival coincided with a period of frequent organizational change as the Army Staff, in general, and ODCSOPS, in particular, worked to find the most efficient way of directing these programs.

The most immediate problem facing the Army in 1981 was that of command and control, communications, and computers (C⁴). The decision in 1978 to split C⁴ functions between the OACSAC and the ODCSOPS proved ill advised, and it was determined that a single manager was essential for C⁴ functions. ACSAC was abolished and all C⁴ programs were merged under a new ADCSOPS in October 1981—a decision that increased ODCSOPS authorized strength by approximately 150 personnel, bringing the total to 743 by the end of fiscal year 1982. Once again, C⁴ functions were under a single Army Staff manager.

The Army Force Modernization Coordination Office (AFMCO) that worked closely with the Force Management Directorate in ODCSOPS also came under review in 1981, and The Inspector General's Office was charged with researching the force modernization problem throughout the Army. Completed in June 1982, the study criticized everyone involved in the force development and management process. For about a year, AFMCO was assigned to report directly to the DCSOPS, but this IG study resulted in more changes within the ODCSOPS structure for force development.

The two 1981 initiatives, dealing with C⁴ modernization and with total force modernization, set key themes for ODCSOPS efforts under Richardson and his successor, Lt. Gen. Fred K. Mahaffey, who served as the DCSOPS from February 1983 through June 1985. Other changes can be traced to a third theme—the doctrinal modifications that ensued because of Army concerns about the expansion of worldwide terrorism and the insurgencies in Central America.

Modernization of the Army's obsolescent C⁴ capabilities involved designing and fielding new systems that would meet the Army's requirements as well as interface with the joint systems. The decision to establish a single Army manager for C⁴ modernization was correct, but overall DCSOPS responsibilities were too broad to give the problem the required attention. In May 1984, all DCSOPS C⁴ functions and responsibilities were transferred to the new Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management. This move was a return to the Army Staff structure that existed before the Abrams 1974 reorganization and, in the process, ODCSOPS lost most of the 150 personnel that it had gained in 1981. This decision enabled ODCSOPS to focus on the broader problem of total force modernization.

The most extensive modifications to ODCSOPS organization occurred in the force development field in July 1983. The AFMCO was dissolved, but a new Force Planning Analysis Office was established under the supervision of the ODCSOPS Technical Advisor. His role in charting ODCSOPS' future was further expanded with the simultaneous creation of a new Studies and Analysis element.

Before July 1983, ODCSOPS force development functions were split between the Requirements and the Force Management Directorates. In order to provide greater unity of effort through more centralized management, these two directorates were dissolved, and a new, consolidated Force Development Directorate was established. The new position of ADCSOPS for Force Development was then created in November 1983 to head the new directorate. At first this reorganization did not change the overall size of ODCSOPS, since it amounted to nothing more than a melding of all the separate divisions and offices of the dissolved directorates into a huge new organization. One division of the old Requirements Directorate, however, disappeared completely. This was the High Technology and Test Division, which had been responsible for testing done in the 9th Infantry Division. Its functions were assumed by the Army Development and Employment Agency—a new field operating agency that was established in September 1983.

With ten separate divisions and the Joint Tactical Fusion Office, the Force Development Directorate was obviously unwieldy, and it

was again split into two distinct directorates. The new Force Programs Directorate basically assumed the divisions that had been part of the old Force Management Directorate and the new Force Requirements Directorate took control of the divisions formerly part of the old Requirements Directorate. However, there was a significant change from the old structure. Instead of reporting directly to the DCSOPS, both new directorates were subordinate to the ADCSOPS for Force Development and their directors shared the same office. This achieved greater unity of effort without sacrificing organizational effectiveness. Even so, the force requirements work load was too great for one general officer to handle efficiently. The availability of another general officer between November 1985 and May 1986 allowed the Force Requirements Directorate to be split temporarily into distinct agencies responsible for weapons systems and for combat support systems.

Other organizational changes within the areas of ADCSOPS for Force Development responsibility reflected changes in overall Army priorities, especially that of interservice interoperability. The Joint Tactical Fusion Office was removed from the supervision of the Director of Force Requirements and, as with a new Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office, it reported directly to the ADCSOPS for Force Development. Created and staffed jointly by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office assumed management and coordination of joint force development initiatives to ensure interoperability.

Also related to AirLand Battle doctrine was the Deep Attack Cell. Established in March 1984 under the ADCSOPS for Force Development and composed of officers stationed both in Washington and at Fort Leavenworth, this group was to study how best to integrate doctrine, weapons, and organizational structures to accomplish the deep attack. In July 1985, this group became the Deep Battle Office. Jointly responsible to the DCSOPS, the DCSRDA, and the ACSIM, this agency coordinated materiel acquisition and force development aspects of deep battle programs.

Response to changed priorities can be seen in the subordinate force development directorates. Responsibility for aviation matters was transferred from a subordinate element of the Firepower Division to a separate and new Aviation Division in the Force Requirements Directorate. Changed priorities also caused the frequent reorganization of the Force Structure Management Division of the Force Programs Directorate as it deleted elements no longer considered as critical as those added to it. One particular addition, the creation in January 1984 of a Light Infantry Division Task Force, illustrates this process. A final change in force development re-

flected a shift from line to functional management as a new field operating agency, the Force Development Support Agency, was created in April 1985. The force program planners were retained within ODCSOPS, but those involved in the operation and development of authorization and force management information systems were moved into the new organization. Management of The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), as well as the development of management information systems to support it, was moved out of ODCSOPS and into the new field operating agency.

Response to changing concerns and priorities also marked reorganizations in other directorates. Reflecting increased emphasis on training being given at all levels within the Army, the Director of Training was upgraded to become the ADCSOPS for Training in April 1984 and, in March 1985, the responsibilities of Inspector of Training were removed from TRADOC and vested in him. Reversing the trend toward functional management in force development matters, the functionally organized Unit Training Division of this directorate was renamed the Forces Training Division and was reorganized with separate elements managing active and reserve forces training. However, the objective again was greater efficiency because training problems in the two components are totally different.

Partly as a result of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an Army Space Office was established within the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate in March 1984 to serve as the Army's focal point for space matters. In May 1986 the Army Space Office was transferred to the Nuclear and Chemical Directorate. This realignment better reflected the role of the Army Space Office in systems development.

Another change affecting the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate stemmed from the Conference of American Armies (instituted in 1960), a biennial meeting of senior officers representing armies of the Western Hemisphere. Because the Army hosted the 1983 meeting, an interim secretariat was established in January 1982 to prepare for it. After the meeting these functions were transferred to Chile, and only a small liaison element remained in the Politico-Military Division of the directorate. A final series of changes occurred with regard to Latin America. Assets were consolidated in the spring of 1983 to create a separate Central American Task Force. With the completion of key policy papers relooking that region, the centralized focus was no longer so urgent by the spring of 1984 and the task force was dissolved.

Further significant modifications were made to the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate toward the end of the tenure of Lt. Gen. Carl E. Vuono, who succeeded Mahaffey in June 1985. The Security Assis-

tance Division was eliminated when the security assistance function was transferred to the DCSLOG in June 1986 to align Army efforts more closely with those of other DOD agencies. At the same time, an International Activities Team was added to the Strategic Plans and Policy Division to develop policy guidance for integrating Army resources and capabilities in support of national policies. Finally, the Politico-Military Division was split into two separate divisions, one responsible for Latin America and the Pacific and the other for Europe, West Asia, Africa, and policy planning.

In the special operations field, the Office of Special Operations was moved from direct DCSOPS supervision to that of the Director of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization, where it became a separate division. In November 1983 the Vice Chief of Staff formed an Army Anti-Terrorism Task Force in response to the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps base at Beirut Airport. Reporting directly to the DCSOPS, this group reviewed installation protection from terrorists and studied means to enhance active counteraction capabilities against terrorist attack. Its work led to the creation of a new entity, the Terrorism Counter-Action Branch within the Special Operations Division.

Another change in the Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate involved the opposite spectrum of military conflict. This was the creation in October 1985 of an Army Command Systems Office charged with improving the Army's ability to survive a strategic nuclear exchange and provide effective command and control in the post-attack period. The office was upgraded to division status in May 1986.

Changes at the top of the ODCSOPS structure also took place during Vuono's tenure when he directed the creation of an Armored Vehicle Family Task Force in March 1986. Based at Fort Eustis, this task force was charged with taking a comprehensive look at the armored vehicle family in an effort to increase efficiency while simultaneously reducing costs. A more significant organizational change took place later in the year. The Office of the Technical Advisor had steadily moved from a pure advisory function to a collateral directing function as it assumed a greater role in doing analytical study itself rather than monitoring the efforts of other ODCSOPS agencies. This change in focus was codified in May 1986 when the Technical Advisor received a collateral appointment as head of a new Analysis Directorate.

To sum up, this was a period in which a broad reconceptualization of Army roles and how best to accomplish them began to achieve fruition. ODCSOPS played a key role in these processes, and the turbulence in its internal organization reflected it. The or-

ganization began to reorder its structure in order better to accomplish priority tasks. Yet, reflecting a “no growth” policy, ODCSOPS overall manpower authorization changed but little during the period. Authorized a total of 760 personnel in June 1983, ODCSOPS was authorized 592 personnel in April 1986—a decrease almost entirely accounted for by the loss of the C⁴ mission.

The Apache helicopter played a vital role in the allied victory in Operation DESERT STORM.



A Time of Mandated Change, 1986–1991

A 1987 Department of the Army report to Congress characterized the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 as “the most important and far-reaching legislation affecting the organization for National Defense enacted in the last three decades.” The act mandated integration of the staff of the Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA) and the Army Staff in areas that Congress viewed as either civilian in nature or essential to effective civilian control. In addition, the law imposed reductions in the overall number of personnel, the number of general officers, and the number of active duty list officers who could be assigned to those staffs. Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., created the Army Reorganization Commission, with representatives from OSA and the Army Staff, in October 1986 to devise a suitable reorganization plan. The resultant plan, approved by Secretary Marsh and Chief of Staff John A. Wickham, Jr., took effect on 30 March 1987.

In the first half of 1986, while the Goldwater-Nichols bill was in gestation, the Office of the Inspector General conducted a follow-up inspection of the Army force integration process, on which the office had reported in 1982. The Inspector General determined that although there had been significant improvement, the lack of a staff agency below the Vice Chief of Staff with sole responsibility for force integration meant that Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), still was not organized to manage the function effectively. As a result, the DCSOPS received the HQDA force integration function, and steps to implement the change became part of the 1987 reorganization.

These two significant mandates for change did much to shape ODCSOPS during the 13½-month tenure as DCSOPS of Lt. Gen. Robert W. RisCassi, who succeeded General Vuono in June 1986. The effects of the changes continued to be felt during the service of RisCassi's successors, Lt. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf (August

1987–October 1988), Lt. Gen. John W. Foss (October 1988–July 1989), Lt. Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan (July 1989–May 1990), and Lt. Gen. Dennis J. Reimer (May 1990–June 1991).

Budgeting was one of the functional areas in which the Goldwater-Nichols Act caused a migration of wherewithal from ODCSOPS to OSA. The DCSOPS' Program and Budget Office, which oversaw operations and maintenance account subprograms, transferred most of its budget personnel to the Army Budget Office in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management). ODCSOPS then combined the remainder of the Program and Budget Office with another office that reported directly to the DCSOPS, the Plans and Integration Division, to form the Resource Analysis and Integration Office. This merger had the effect, after a period of adjustment, of creating a single ODCSOPS element that oversaw planning, programming, budgeting, and execution—a structure that met ODCSOPS' need to set priorities among Army programs in each of these phases.

In another element reporting directly to the DCSOPS, the Office of the Technical Advisor, two new entities emerged at about the time of the creation of the Army Reorganization Commission. The Force Planning and Analysis Division was abolished and its personnel merged with the Studies Division to create the Studies and Analysis Division. The realigned division deemphasized in-house macro-level analyses in favor of increased concentration on controlling the quality of analyses done for ODCSOPS by other agencies. Simultaneously, the Information Management Division was established to meet a perceived need to manage computer automation support as ODCSOPS effected a large procurement of personal computers and software packages. As part of the Army Staff reductions in the 1987 reorganization, the Information Management Division moved off the staff and became an ODCSOPS staff support agency, the U.S. Army Plans and Operations Information Management Support Agency (USAPOISA). USAPOISA's function developed primarily into the automation and management of data and large data bases, and the management of the architecture for automation within ODCSOPS.

By far the greatest shift in personnel spaces in the 1987 reorganization involved the retitled Office of the ADCSOPS (Force Development and Integration), which, in contrast to ODCSOPS as a whole, gained significantly. Most of the accretion stemmed from the assignment to the ADCSOPS of the responsibility for force integration. A total of twenty-eight spaces moved to Force Development and Integration from other parts of ODCSOPS and from the Army Reorganization Commission in order to provide action officers for organizational integration. Eleven spaces were transferred

from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management to facilitate Force Development and Integration's determination of priorities and requirements for command, control, and communications systems. Other ODCSOPS elements and the abolished Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition furnished thirteen more spaces for various functions, so that Force Development and Integration gained a total of fifty-two spaces.

Also in the wake of the Inspector General's report and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a combination of functions took place within Force Development and Integration's Force Requirements Directorate. From a merger of the Force Structure Program Division and the Force Structure Management Division came the Force Integration and Management Division. While it saved a few spaces, this consolidation more importantly gave the ADCSOPS a single entity responsible for force structure for all commands, all TDAs, all MTOEs, and all modernization.

The opposite tendency—a division of functions—marked the development of the overall requirements mission in Force Development and Integration. In a continuing search for a solution to the challenge of span of control in this area, the responsibilities of the Director of Force Requirements were reconfigured and distributed in 1987 among a Director of Requirements and Integration (Deep Operations) and a Director of Requirements and Integration (Close Operations). A further reconfiguration in mid-1990 created a Director of Requirements (Combat) and a Director of Requirements (Support). With the Goldwater-Nichols reduction of general officers on the Army Staff, Force Development and Integration was unable to obtain a brigadier general's slot for the Requirements (Support) position, and filled it with a colonel (promotable).

Under the purview of the Director of Requirements and Integration (Close Operations), there was created in June 1989 an Armor Systems Modernization Coordination Office, whose goal was to have several vehicles with a common chassis. After a name change to Heavy Force Modernization Office, the office made a transition in June 1990 to become the Major Systems Coordination Office under the Director of Requirements (Support). The new entity had responsibility for managing and providing analytic support for armor systems modernization, the light helicopter (later the Comanche), and deep fires (fire support). In a further transition, the office in June 1991 became the Future Combat Systems Division.

In June 1989 the ADCSOPS created the Joint Tactical Missile Defense Task Force to coordinate, manage, and integrate that program for the Army. Two years later, after Congress had transferred

the program executive officer responsibility from the Army to the Department of Defense to achieve greater centralized control, the task force was abolished.

It was also in the summer of 1989 that General Sullivan launched the Quicksilver initiative, designed to match reduced resources and force structure in the 1992–97 Program Objective Memorandum. The following April, the Quicksilver Implementation Task Force was established within Force Development and Integration to serve as ODCSOPS' focal point for continuous coordination with both HQDA staff and major command elements for the intensive management of Quicksilver actions.

A move for greater efficiency and streamlining of field operating agencies dealing with documentation of the force and of the manpower provided to the force took place on 1 October 1989 with the establishment of the U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency. The new agency consolidated two field operating agencies of ODCSOPS, the U.S. Army Force Development Support Agency and the U.S. Army Manpower Requirements and Documentation Agency, and a field operating agency of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the U.S. Army Equipment Authorization Review Agency. As a field operating agency of ODCSOPS, reporting to the ADCSOPS, the Force Integration Support Agency supported manpower surveys and produced documentation of the whole force, both equipment and manpower spaces.

After Force Development and Integration, the greatest change in personnel spaces in the 1987 reorganization involved the Training Directorate. Unlike Force Development, however, Training suffered a net loss of twenty-four spaces, or 48 percent of its strength. The position of Director of Training was reduced from a major general's slot to that of a brigadier general, and the concomitant position of ADCSOPS (Training) was abolished, with the responsibilities of Inspector of Training reverting to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Half a dozen other training functions also were transferred to TRADOC: the Training Career Program; the Training Literature Program; the Audiovisual Support for Training Program; Officer Course Quota Management; the Interservice Training Review Organization; and the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems Training Program. In addition, responsibility for personnel training was reassigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and for logistics training to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (the intelligence training responsibility went to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in February 1990).

Within the directorate, the Institutional Training and Forces Training Divisions were consolidated into a new Training Operations Division, which also absorbed a cell whose primary function was managing the funds for Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises. The function of providing resources for unit training, which had been in the Forces Training Division, moved to the existing Training Support Division. Since the formation of policy for unit training resided in the Training Operations Division, however, better coordination required that the unit training resources function also be placed there, and this move was made incrementally in 1990-91.

In 1987-88, TRADOC and the U.S. Army Forces Command developed a Reserve Component training strategy that matured in 1988 in the Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan. The Army's leaders decided that a new division was needed to direct implementation of the plan. Early in 1989, all elements in the ODCSOPS Training Directorate that dealt with Reserve Component training were combined to form a new Reserve Component Training/Integration Division. Although the Training Operations Division consequently lost a few slots, it also gained some when General Vuono, now the Chief of Staff, directed that the leader development function be added to the division.

In the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, a major organizational change resulted from arms control negotiations. The directorate in 1987 increasingly became involved in staff preparations for Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty negotiations, which culminated in the signing of a U.S.-Soviet agreement in December of that year. At the same time, the directorate became engaged in work related to conventional arms control. The Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division and the War Plans Division each performed some of this work until July 1988, when the Conventional Arms Negotiations Division was formed to serve as the Army's focal point for conventional arms negotiations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. The necessary personnel spaces came from abolition of the Long Range Planning Group, whose functions were absorbed by the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division, and from the War Plans Division.

ODCSOPS assumed another treaty-related function in August 1989, when the Secretary of Defense chartered the Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan Agency. A staff support agency of ODCSOPS, the new organization became the Department of Defense's executive agent for implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 between the United States and Panama. The treaty provides for increasing participation by Panama in the management,

protection, and defense of the Canal until transfer of the canal and the Panama Canal Zone to Panama is completed in 1999.

Within the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, there were changes in function, stemming from the Goldwater-Nichols Act, that were more subtle because they involved modifications in procedure rather than in organization. The reorganization act increased the power of the Joint Staff, and by 1989 that body was playing a more assertive role vis-a-vis the service staffs in joint planning. There was less consultation than previously with the Army Staff. On some issues the Joint Staff consulted only the service that it perceived to have a primary interest. For ODCSOPS this trend meant a reduction in influence in joint planning.

While ODCSOPS' role in joint planning diminished, its part in military space operations was on the upswing. When the Army Space Office was transferred from the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate to the Nuclear and Chemical Directorate in 1986, the latter was renamed the Space and Special Weapons Directorate. A field operating agency of the directorate, the Army Space Agency, was upgraded in April 1988 to become the Army Space Command, the Army component of the U.S. Space Command. The Army Space Command experienced organizational growth as the result of a new mission to command the Defense Satellite Communications System Operations Centers.

In an additional mission assumed by the Space and Special Weapons Directorate, the Chemical Retrograde Task Force was formed in July 1989 to oversee Army planning efforts and to develop the operation plan for the removal of the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Director of Space and Special Weapons was designated director of the task force, which completed the removal of the munitions to Johnston Island in the central Pacific Ocean in November 1990.

The directed military overstrength spaces that had been allocated to man the Chemical Retrograde Task Force were carried over for a new mission in Space and Special Weapons. Because of the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from eastern Europe and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the directorate was charged with planning the drawdown of short-range nuclear capabilities in Europe. The result of the consequent planning was the approval of the Army's nuclear weapons drawdown plan at the end of July 1991.

In the Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate, there was an organizational change in the area of special operations forces. The Special Operations Division was reorganized in November 1987 as the U.S. Army Special Operations Agency, which in April 1988 was designated an ODCSOPS staff support

agency. Two divisions comprised the agency: the Special Operations Policy and Forces Division, responsible for Army Staff actions relating to special operations forces, operations security, special plans, and special mission units; and the Program, Budget, and Resource Division, with responsibility for Army Staff actions relating to programming, budgeting, acquisition, and logistical support for special operations forces and special mission units.

Renewed and growing emphasis on psychological and civil affairs operations and a major force modernization programmed in both areas created a need for a focal point for these functions on the Army Staff. In February 1988 a Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Division therefore was established in the Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate (a provisional organization for psychological operations had existed since May 1986). The division subsequently grew with the addition of Reserve Component officers on active duty.

Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization added another division by virtue of a transfer from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in October 1987. The Office of Army Law Enforcement and the U.S. Army Military Police Operations Agency shifted from ODCSPER to become the Security, Force Protection, and Law Enforcement Division, thereby combining staff responsibility for, and functional management of, the Army's security. This reorganization culminated repeated efforts by personnel in the transferred elements to effect the change.

To provide centralized coordination and oversight of Army efforts in the national "war on drugs," General Foss established the Army Anti-Drug Task Force Division in May 1989 in Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization. Guidance from the Department of Defense Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support caused the division's name to be changed to Army Counter-Drug Division in June 1991.

Growing maturity in the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise program permitted a reduction in the size of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization's commitment in that area. By 1988 stable planning and execution cycles existed, and Army participation had become more refined, with increased repetitiveness in tasks. The number of personnel assigned to the Joint Command Post Exercise Division therefore was reduced through attrition until the spring of 1989, when the division ceased to exist as such and became a branch within the Operations and Contingency Plans Division.

On 1 March 1989, after sixteen years as a field operating agency of HQDA with ODCSOPS proponency, the U.S. Army Center of Military History was redesignated as a field operating agency

of HQDA with the Office of the Chief of Staff as the proponent. This change aimed at streamlining the historical office's accessibility to Army Staff principals and reflected the center's application to its own situation of its philosophy that major command historians should report directly to their commanders.

June 1991 found ODCSOPS with an authorized personnel strength of 550. This figure represented a decrease of only 3 spaces from the pre-Goldwater-Nichols days of September 1986. But the Army Staff as a whole lost one-third of its authorized spaces in the 1987 reorganization, and by June 1991 had decreased even further. ODCSOPS by contrast had fared much better because it continued to be the nerve center of the Army Staff.

Conclusion

In war and emergency ODCSOPS and its predecessors have acted as the de facto command post for the Chief of Staff of the Army. In World War I the position of Chief of Staff was limited by the legal fiction that the Chief of Staff acted solely as an adviser and coordinator for the Secretary of War and possessed no independent authority of his own. During the Vietnam conflict an expanded and aggressive OSD and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which removed the service chiefs from the chain of command, blurred the lines of policy and hence responsibility; however, the Chief of Staff, by virtue of his position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ODCSOPS, by reason of its responsibilities for joint planning, continued to play a large role. Only during World War II and to a lesser extent the Korean War did the Chief of Staff possess powers at all commensurate with his functional responsibilities. Only in World War II did a Chief of Staff establish a super-coordinating institution to transmit his decisions to the field forces.

The Operations Division did not survive the postwar reorganization, but each subsequent Staff reorganization has produced wistful comments about reestablishing OPD. The wistfulness expresses a yearning for the lack of ambiguity inherent in the Marshall reorganization. To an uncommon extent the little boxes in organization charts during World War II mirrored the realities of power within the Army Staff. War is thus a major reason for the expansion of ODCSOPS and the advent of peace a cause for its reduction. For the American public the return to normalcy consists of "bringing the boys home," cutting the defense budget, and forgetting the war as soon as possible. For the Army Staff it involves returning to pre-war power relationships as soon as possible. ODCSOPS loses functions and personnel.

This is a partial, not a total, explanation. The 1955, 1963, 1983, and 1987 reorganizations do not fit this pattern. Each, of course, only can be explained fully in terms of the specific context in which it occurred, but the fact that they recur suggests that certain

general forces are at work throughout the period. The Army is a task-oriented institution. The planning for and execution of missions—the operations function—lies at the heart of the organization. The Army thus perceives ODCSOPS as the “first among equals.” It is “where the action is” on the Army Staff for all those officers who are not technical specialists. The office seeks aggressive and action-oriented officers. If other Staff agencies are not performing necessary functions related to operations or are performing such functions poorly, the action officers in ODCSOPS will do the job.

Appendix

DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS

Chiefs, Third Division

Col. Alexander Mackenzie	15 Aug	1903–05 Feb	1904
Col. Arthur L. Wagner	06 Feb	1904–16 Jun	1906
Lt. Col. William W. Wotherspoon	17 Jun	1906–26 Jun	1908

Chiefs, Second Section

Brig. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon	27 Jun	1908–30 Nov	1909
Lt. Col. Daniel A. Frederick	01 Dec	1909–25 Sep	1910

Chiefs, War College Division

Lt. Col. Daniel A. Frederick	26 Sep	1910–31 Dec	1910
Col. John Biddle	14 Apr	1911–13 Jan	1912
Lt. Col. Hunter Liggett	14 Jan	1912–01 Feb	1912
Brig. Gen. Albert L. Mills	02 Feb	1912–31 Aug	1912
Brig. Gen. William Crozier	01 Sep	1912–30 Jun	1913
Brig. Gen. Hunter Liggett	01 Jul	1913–21 Apr	1914
Brig. Gen. Montgomery M. Macomb	22 Apr	1914–12 Oct	1916
Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn	01 Feb	1917–24 Aug	1917
Col. P. D. Lochridge (Acting)	25 Aug	1917–10 Jan	1918
Col. Daniel W. Ketcham (Acting)	11 Jan	1918–08 Feb	1918

Directors, War Plans Division

Col. Daniel W. Ketcham (Acting)	09 Feb	1918–30 Apr	1918
Brig. Gen. Lytle Brown	01 May	1918–13 Jun	1919
Maj. Gen. William G. Haan	14 Jun	1919–31 Aug	1921

Director, Operations Division

Maj. Gen. Henry Jervey	12 Jul	1918–31 Aug	1921
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Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-3

Brig. Gen. William Lassiter	01 Sep	1921-31 Oct	1923
Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Drum	04 Dec	1923-08 Apr	1926
Maj. Gen. Malin Craig	09 Apr	1926-01 Apr	1927
Maj. Gen. Frank Parker	02 Apr	1927-02 Apr	1929
Maj. Gen. Edward L. King	16 Jul	1929-01 Feb	1932
Maj. Gen. Edgar T. Collins	02 Feb	1932-10 Feb	1933
Maj. Gen. John H. Hughes	06 Jul	1933-15 Apr	1937
Brig. Gen. George P. Tyner	16 Apr	1937-06 Mar	1938
Maj. Gen. Robert McC. Beck	07 Mar	1938-03 Aug	1939
Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews	04 Aug	1939-22 Nov	1940
Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle	23 Nov	1940-08 Apr	1941
Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony	09 Apr	1941-23 Apr	1941
Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle	24 Apr	1941-25 Mar	1942
Brig. Gen. Harold R. Bull	25 Mar	1942-05 May	1942
Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards	16 May	1942-15 May	1943
Maj. Gen. Ray E. Porter	16 May	1943-13 Feb	1945
Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards	14 Feb	1945-09 Jun	1946

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, War Plans Division

Brig. Gen. Briant H. Wells	01 Sep	1921-30 Oct	1923
Brig. Gen. Stuart Heintzelman	01 Dec	1923-01 Jul	1924
Brig. Gen. Leroy Eltinge	02 Jul	1924-19 Apr	1925
Maj. Gen. Harry A. Smith	01 Jul	1925-31 May	1927
Brig. Gen. George S. Simonds	01 Sep	1927-01 Sep	1931
Brig. Gen. Joseph P. Tracy	02 Sep	1931-31 Aug	1932
Brig. Gen. Charles K. Kilbourne	01 Sep	1932-11 Feb	1935
Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick	12 Mar	1935-28 May	1936
Brig. Gen. Walter Krueger	29 May	1936-30 Jun	1938
Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall	06 Jul	1938-15 Oct	1938
Brig. Gen. George V. Strong	16 Oct	1938-14 Dec	1940
Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow	16 Dec	1940-15 Feb	1942
Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower	16 Feb	1942-08 Mar	1942

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, Operations Division

Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower	09 Mar	1942-23 Jun	1942
Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy	24 Jun	1942-21 Oct	1944
Lt. Gen. John E. Hull	22 Oct	1944-15 Jun	1946

Directors of Organization and Training

Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards	11 Jun	1946-09 Jul	1946
Lt. Gen. Charles P. Hall	10 Jul	1946-11 Nov	1948
Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull	15 Nov	1948-07 Jun	1949
Maj. Gen. Cliff Andrus	08 Jun	1949-28 Feb	1950

Directors of Plans and Operations

Lt. Gen. John E. Hull	11 Jun	1946-15 Jun	1946
Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad	16 Jun	1946-29 Oct	1947
Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer	31 Oct	1947-14 Nov	1948
Maj. Gen. Ray T. Maddocks	15 Nov	1948-15 May	1949
Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte	16 May	1949-28 Feb	1950

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-3, Operations

Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte	01 Mar	1950-12 Feb	1951
Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor	13 Feb	1951-31 Jul	1951
Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins	01 Aug	1951-04 Aug	1952
Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman	05 Aug	1952-31 Mar	1954
Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin	01 Apr	1954-24 Mar	1955
Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams	25 Mar	1955-24 Jul	1955
Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins	25 Jul	1955-31 Dec	1955

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Military Operations

Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman	03 Jan	1956-31 May	1958
Lt. Gen. James E. Moore	01 Jun	1958-31 Oct	1959
Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes	01 Nov	1959-19 Jan	1961
Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett	20 Jan	1961-31 Mar	1962
Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker	01 May	1962-30 Jun	1963
Lt. Gen. Harold K. Johnson	01 Jul	1963-02 Jul	1964
Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr.	09 Jul	1964-31 May	1965
Lt. Gen. Vernon P. Mock	01 Jun	1965-30 Aug	1966
Lt. Gen. Harry J. Lemley, Jr.	01 Sep	1966-23 Jul	1969
Lt. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell	01 Aug	1969-30 Sep	1972
Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles	01 Oct	1972-19 May	1974

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations and Plans

Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles	20 May 1974–31 Aug 1975
Lt. Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr.	01 Sep 1975–30 Sep 1976
Lt. Gen. Edward C. Meyer	01 Oct 1976–21 Jun 1979
Lt. Gen. Glenn T. Otis	24 Aug 1979–29 Jul 1981
Lt. Gen. William R. Richardson	01 Aug 1981–25 Feb 1983
Lt. Gen. Fred K. Mahaffey	26 Feb 1983–16 Jun 1985
Lt. Gen. Carl E. Vuono	17 Jun 1985–22 Jun 1986
Lt. Gen. Robert W. RisCassi	23 Jun 1986–09 Aug 1987
Lt. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf	10 Aug 1987–11 Oct 1988
Lt. Gen. John W. Foss	12 Oct 1988–20 Jul 1989
Lt. Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan	21 Jul 1989–30 May 1990
Lt. Gen. Dennis J. Reimer	31 May 1990–23 Jun 1991
Lt. Gen. J. H. Binford Peay III	24 Jun 1991–

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